US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by August 31, 2026?
🗂 Part of event: US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…? →💡 What the odds say
The market puts this at about a 7% chance — very unlikely.
No money — just record your call and see if you were right. Yes is at 7% right now.
The market heavily discounts a final nuclear deal by August 31, 2026, despite a signed interim agreement in June, because the Trump administration has introduced a new condition—Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords—and is publicly pessimistic about clinching a deal.
📊 Base rate: Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, no comprehensive US-Iran nuclear deal has been finalized within a 60-day negotiating window, making the current 7% odds consistent with historical precedent.
What's driving it
- • On July 23, the White House briefing tied a final nuclear deal to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, adding a complex new condition that was not part of the June interim agreement (PBS, Jul 23).
- • On July 10, the WSJ reported the Trump administration is 'increasingly pessimistic' about clinching a deal, signaling internal doubt and reducing the likelihood of a breakthrough (WSJ, Jul 10).
- • On June 24, AP News highlighted a public dispute over nuclear inspections, indicating unresolved technical disagreements that could derail final negotiations (AP News, Jun 24).
The case for YES
- • The June 14 interim deal includes a 60-day extendable period, providing a formal framework and deadline that could pressure both sides to reach a final written instrument by August 31.
- • The interim deal already grants UN inspectors access to Iran's nuclear sites, a key confidence-building measure that could accelerate final negotiations (CNBC, Jun 26).
- • President Trump has a track record of surprising diplomatic breakthroughs, such as the 2020 Abraham Accords, and may push for a deal to secure a foreign policy win before the end of his term.
The case for NO
- • The Trump administration's new demand that Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords as a prerequisite for a nuclear deal introduces a major obstacle unlikely to be resolved in the remaining weeks (PBS, Jul 23).
- • The administration's own reported pessimism, per the WSJ, suggests internal resistance or lack of political will to finalize a deal by the deadline (WSJ, Jul 10).
- • Public disputes over nuclear inspections, as reported by AP News, indicate that core technical and verification issues remain unresolved, making a final agreement by August 31 improbable (AP News, Jun 24).
What to watch
- • Any official statement from the White House or State Department clarifying whether Saudi Arabia's inclusion is a firm condition or a negotiable goal would likely move odds toward No if it remains a requirement, or toward Yes if it is dropped.
- • A scheduled meeting of the UN nuclear watchdog (IAEA) to report on Iran's compliance with inspections could move odds toward Yes if compliance is confirmed, or toward No if violations are found.
- • A public announcement of a new round of direct US-Iran talks before August 15 would increase the odds of a Yes resolution, while a cancellation or delay would push odds toward No.
AI-generated · grounded in recent news + odds · informational only, not advice. Verify on the source platform.
Data from Polymarket’s public API, for informational purposes only. PredictPal is not affiliated with any platform and does not facilitate trading.
Discussion
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How it resolves
Settled on-chain by UMA's optimistic oracle: once an outcome is clear, anyone can propose the result, which then enters a challenge window where it can be disputed with evidence before it finalizes.
⚖️ A proposed outcome can be disputed during a challenge window before it's final.
Resolution criteria
On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify. The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: (i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies. An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.
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