US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?
🗂 Part of event: US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by…? →💡 What the odds say
The market puts this at about a 31% chance — unlikely.
No money — just record your call and see if you were right. Yes is at 31% right now.
While the June 14 framework agreement gave a formal negotiating path, the odds remain low because both sides are publicly conditioning progress on stark ultimatums—Iran demands an end to threats, Trump warns of military action—making a final deal by year-end a long shot despite the slight upward drift.
What's driving it
- • The June 14 written diplomatic agreement created a structured 60-day extendable negotiation period, providing a concrete mechanism for talks (Arms Control Association, Jul 7), which explains the slight +2pt 7d uptick.
- • Iran’s condition that final-deal talks will not start if threats continue (Middle East Monitor, Jul 7) directly clashes with Trump’s simultaneous threats to 'finish the job' (Nikkei Asia, Jul 7), capping the odds at a low 31%.
- • Trump’s postponement of a 'final determination' on an Iran proposal (NYT, Jul 2) signals internal U.S. debate, which adds uncertainty but also leaves the door open for a deal.
- • Public disputes over nuclear inspections (AP, Jun 24) illustrate that even the basic trust needed for a final deal is fragile, keeping the No probability dominant.
The case for YES
- • The June 14 framework formally commits both sides to negotiate a 'final deal' within a defined 60-day period that can be extended, giving a clear process that could produce a signed instrument by year-end.
- • Trump has repeatedly stated he prefers a nuclear deal with Iran (Middle East Monitor, Jul 6), meaning the U.S. is incentivized to reach an agreement rather than escalate to military action.
The case for NO
- • Iran insists final-deal talks will not begin unless U.S. threats stop (Middle East Monitor, Jul 7), but Trump has not committed to halting threats and instead warns of military consequences (Nikkei Asia, Jul 7), creating a fundamental precondition gap.
- • Historical disputes over nuclear inspections (AP, Jun 24) indicate deep-rooted mistrust that is unlikely to be resolved in five months, especially with mutual public posturing.
What to watch
- • Mid-August 2026 deadline for the initial 60-day period from the June 14 agreement – an extension would boost Yes odds; a breakdown or no-extension would spike No odds.
- • Any announced round of direct talks or a new U.S. proposal on inspections (following the NYT Jul 2 'postponement') – concrete progress would lift Yes; further delays or threats would push No higher.
- • Potential military incidents or a formal U.S. ultimatum from Trump before year-end – such escalation would heavily reduce likelihood of a negotiated deal, moving odds sharply toward No.
AI-generated · grounded in recent news + odds · informational only, not advice. Verify on the source platform.
Data from Polymarket’s public API, for informational purposes only. PredictPal is not affiliated with any platform and does not facilitate trading.
Discussion
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How it resolves
Settled on-chain by UMA's optimistic oracle: once an outcome is clear, anyone can propose the result, which then enters a challenge window where it can be disputed with evidence before it finalizes.
⚖️ A proposed outcome can be disputed during a challenge window before it's final.
Resolution criteria
On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify. The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: (i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies. An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.
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